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Introduction
‘Security’ is a multi-faceted term (see, for 
example, Buzan and Hansen 2009). Even 
if there is agreement on the threat from 
which some object ought to be secure 
(this paper focuses on physical violence 
by a political armed group – political vio-
lence for short), ‘security’ can mean many 
things. It can be an individual feeling, the 
probability of a particular threat occurring, 
a condition a group of individuals is in, or 
perceive themselves to be in. This is not 
a new argument; it is even clear from the 
dictionary definition of the term ‘security.’ 
However, it is tempting to assume that all 
the above aspects of security are closely 
related. In the case of research, this may 
mean motivating research into the ‘security’ 
of a state by citing how destructive individ-
ual fear of threats is to the economy. In the 
case of policy, this may mean assuming that 
those interventions that are considered suc-
cessful in improving one aspect of security 
also help, or at least do not hinder, others. 
If various aspects of security are indeed 
strongly correlated, this assumption may 
well be close to the truth. If they are not, 
there is scope for a mismatch between secu-
rity interventions and certain aspects of 
security: an expression of the security gap. 
This paper investigates the correlation 
between various aspects of security. It distin-
guishes four such aspects: technical safety, 
perceived safety, technical security and per-
ceived security. It will show that, concep-
tually, there is no need for these aspects 
to be strongly related to each other. It will 
also illustrate that each aspect of security 
may be the target of a security intervention, 
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depending on the rationale for intervening. 
This opens up the possibility of a security 
gap: a security intervention targeting one 
aspect of security using one rationale, whilst 
not affecting or adversely affecting another. 
Several cases illustrate a security gap of this 
kind in practice. Focussing on one particu-
lar threat, physical violence by a politically 
organised armed group, this paper will then 
consider the correlation between different 
aspects of security empirically. It illustrates 
how the attention of those producing indica-
tors related to ‘security’ has shifted over time 
towards measuring different aspects of it. 
Using these various indicators, it then shows 
that indicators for different aspects of secu-
rity are weakly correlated in two cases. 
The remainder of this paper is organized 
in two sections: the first section breaks 
down the term ‘security’ before investigat-
ing the relationship between the various 
concepts covered by the term ‘security’ con-
ceptually. The second section outlines which 
aspects of security are covered by empirical 
indicators and investigates whether these 
correlate empirically.
The security gap: when ‘security’ and 
security interventions do not align
Defining ‘security’
Security is a fast-moving and contested con-
cept; the term has been redefined many times 
over the last decades and there is no consen-
sus as to its meaning. The paper by Kaldor 
and Selchow in this special issue (2015) high-
lights this, and Buzan and Hansen (2009) 
provide a comprehensive overview (Buzan 
and Hansen 2009).
A look at the Oxford English Dictionary 
illustrates that the term ‘security’ is used, at 
least colloquially, to describe a number of 
distinct concepts: the state of being free from 
danger or threat, the state of feeling safe 
and free from fear and procedures followed 
or measures taken to ensure the security of 
a state or organisation. Hence, ‘security’ can 
describe an individual condition, the condi-
tion of some collective entity, a perception 
of either of these conditions and measures 
taken to ensure a particular condition. In 
academic literature, we also find these dis-
tinct meanings of the term ‘security.’ Paris 
(2001), for example, defines human security 
as both ‘safety from chronic threats’ – a col-
lective or individual condition – and ‘protec-
tion from sudden and hurtful disruptions 
in [ . . . ] daily life’ – a measure to ensure an 
individual condition – (Paris, 2001). Booth 
(2015) defines ‘security’ as ‘the condition of 
feeling or being safe from threats (emphasis 
added)’ – an individual or collective con-
dition, or a perception of this condition 
(Booth 2014).
I argue that it is important to distinguish 
between these meanings of the term secu-
rity. As will be illustrated below, whether 
we define security as a perception, collec-
tive condition or individual condition makes 
a difference for which measures we think 
are effective in achieving it. Furthermore, 
improved ‘security’ according to one defi-
nition may not mean improved security 
according to another. Calling distinct objec-
tives and the measures to achieve them all 
‘security’ can obscure this.
For the purpose of this paper, the overarch-
ing topic of interest is the condition of ‘being 
free from threats.’ This phrase is included in 
a great many definitions of the term ‘security’ 
(e.g. Booth 2014; Owen 2008; Paris 2001). 
This condition can apply to an individual or 
to some aggregation of individuals. To dis-
tinguish between the two, I call the former 
safety and the latter security. This is some-
what arbitrary: the terms are often used 
interchangeably, as Paris’ (2001) definition 
of human security and the dictionary defi-
nitions outlined above illustrate. However, 
there is a sense that safety applies more 
strongly to the individual, whereas security 
applies more often to an aggregate entity. For 
instance, it seems more natural to speak of 
‘personal safety’ and ‘national security’ than 
of ‘national safety’ and ‘personal security’. 
Similarly, some authors in military circles 
make a distinction that between ‘national 
security’ and ‘troop safety’ (Glenn et al. 1998). 
I don’t claim this use of the terms safety and 
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security is universal and I am aware that one 
could put forward many examples to the con-
trary. Nevertheless, in the interest of making 
a clear distinction, in this paper I use safety 
to refer to individual freedom from threats, 
and security to refer to freedom from threat 
of some group of individuals.
Secondly, I distinguish between techni-
cal and perceived freedom from threats. The 
former refers to the probability that an indi-
vidual or group of individuals will be subject 
to a particular threat. The latter refers to how 
likely an individual thinks a particular threat 
is to happen and the resultant fear or anxi-
ety. This definition leaves open the subject 
of the perceiving: there can be as many per-
ceptions of the same condition as there are 
individuals.
These two distinctions, individual – aggre-
gate and technical – perceived, lead to the 
2 × 2 matrix defining aspects of security 
depicted in Table 1. Not represented in this 
figure, is the definition of ‘security’ as meas-
ures taken to ensure freedom from threats. 
I will call such measures security interven-
tions. The objective of security interventions 
can be to promote any (combination) of the 
concepts making up security depicted in 
Table 1.
Relationships between the different 
concepts making up security
To explore the relationships between the 
four concepts making up security it is helpful 
to define how these can be expressed empiri-
cally. To do so, one should specify a particular 
threat an individual or group is free from, and 
do so consistently across the four concepts. It 
is not clear whether and how distinct threats, 
such as an earthquake and gun crime, could 
validly be aggregated or compared empiri-
cally. Which particular threat one identifies 
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individual member of a 
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particular threat/ perceived degree to which 
the aggregate entity is subjected to a particular 
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Term Technical safety Perceived safety
Definition Individual freedom from 
threats
Perceived individual freedom from threats / fear 
of threats to the individual
Empirical 
representation i
t ( ),   e.g.  i j i jf t td d
Indicator Probability an individual 
will be subjected to a 
particular threat
Perceived probability an individual will be 
subjected to a particular threat / degree of fear 
an individual will be subjected to a particular 
threat
Table 1: Aspects of security: four concepts.
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already reveals a particular outlook on ‘secu-
rity’: Kaldor and Selchow (2015) identify a 
number of ‘security cultures’ each with a 
distinct view on what are the most pertinent 
threats. This section highlights however that 
even for the same threat, the four concepts 
making up security may correlate imper-
fectly or may not be correlated at all.
Technical safety is denoted by ti, the proba-
bility that individual i is subject to a particular 
threat. Empirically, the other four concepts 
making up security are derived from this. 
Research suggests that perceived safety is 
influenced, but not fully determined, by tech-
nical safety (e.g. Slovic et al. 1985). Hence, I 
model perceived safety as some function of 
technical safety and another factor δj specific to 
individual j doing the perceiving. The remain-
der of this paper mainly treats the case when 
i = j: a person’s perception of their own 
safety. Brück et al (2014) call δi a ‘fear factor’ 
and model perceived safety as the product of 
this ‘fear factor’ and effort devoted to terror-
ism. Hence, this fear factor either amplifies 
(when greater than 1) or tones down (when 
between 0 and 1) technical safety in the indi-
vidual perception (Brück et al. 2014). A num-
ber of studies investigate what determines δj. 
Kahneman and Tversky pioneered the idea 
people rely on mental short-cuts when esti-
mating probabilities. For instance, we may 
judge the likelihood of an event by the ease 
with which similar instances come to mind 
(availability). Kahneman and Tversky show 
that this may lead to substantial differences 
between technical and perceived probability. 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1974). Slovic et al. 
(1985) coin the factors ‘unknown’ (the extent 
to which a threat is new, unfamiliar, invol-
untary or has delayed effects) and ‘dread’ 
(the extent to which a threat is fatal to large 
numbers) and show that these are systemati-
cally related to differences between people’s 
perceptions and technical estimations of the 
probability of a threat (Slovic et al. 1985). 
Sandman suggests that people underesti-
mate probability of threats when there is a 
sense they are encountered voluntarily (e.g. 
a sporting accident versus a car crash), that 
they can exercise some control (e.g. driving 
versus flying), when the threat is familiar (e.g. 
smoking versus a newly discovered chemical 
in food) and when threats affect a population 
equally (e.g. air pollution versus living next to 
a nuclear plant) (Sandman 1987).
The larger δi (for δi >1) or the smaller δi (for 
δi between 0 and 1), the larger the difference 
between a single individual’s technical safety 
and their perception of their own safety. The 
case is not quite as simple when we consider 
the strength of the correlation between techni-
cal safety and own perceived safety for a sam-
ple of individuals. If own perceived safety is ti δi, 
the impact of δi on the correlation between 
technical and perceived safety is easiest seen 
when we consider the Spearman rank correla-
tion coefficient. Consider ordering all individu-
als in the sample according to their decreasing 
technical safety. As long as multiplying techni-
cal safety with the ‘fear factor’ does not alter 
this ordering of individuals, technical safety 
and perceived safety will be perfectly corre-
lated. When applying the ‘fear factor’ changes 
or even reverses this ordering, for example 
when those individual most technically safe 
perceived themselves to be the most unsafe, 
the correlation becomes weaker or negative.
Technical security, the freedom from 
threats of a particular group of individuals, 
is represented empirically by probability 
that an individual in this group is subject 
to a particular threat. A real world exam-
ple might be the number of homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants of a country; a com-
mon measure of insecurity due to crime. 
Technical security and technical safety are 
thus very directly related: technical security 
is simply the aggregation of technical safety, 
relative to the size of the group (denoted by 
N). That does not necessarily imply that tech-
nical security and technical safety correlate 
strongly: this depends on how uniformly 
technical safety is distributed among the 
members of the group. If we take a sample 
of individuals from more than one different 
group, take their level of technical safety as 
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one variable, and the level of technical secu-
rity of the group the individual belongs to 
as another, these two variables will correlate 
perfectly if all individuals in the group have 
the same level of technical safety (implying 
technical safety equals technical security for 
each individual). When some individuals in 
the group enjoy a higher level of technical 
safety than others, the strength of this cor-
relation decreases.
This also illustrates that there need not 
be a close relationship between technical 
security and perceived safety. Although both 
are derived from technical safety, perceived 
safety is not necessarily correlated strongly to 
technical safety (due to the ‘fear factor), and 
technical safety is not necessarily correlated 
strongly to technical security (due to the 
aggregation effect). However, even if neither 
relationship is strong, it is possible that per-
ceived safety and technical security correlate 
if the ‘fear factor’ δi is somehow related to 
technical security. Gerbner et al. (1980) have 
suggested a similar effect termed affinity. 
This suggests that individuals fear a particu-
lar threat more if they receive information 
about someone similar to them experiencing 
this threat, as compared to when they receive 
information about a person they perceive 
as not in their group (Gerbner et al. 1980). 
However, empirical evidence for the affinity 
effect is scarce (Eschholz 1997).
Finally, perceived security is some function 
of technical security and some other factor 
ηi. This factor could represent a ‘fear factor’ 
as it was presented at the individual level. In 
addition, the group might represent some-
thing different in people’s perceptions than 
the aggregation of the constituent individu-
als. To the extent that this amplifies or tones 
down perceived security relative to technical 
security, this is captured by ηj. For example, 
‘the State’ might represent more than the 
sum of all its citizens. In this case the State 
could still be perceived to be under threat 
even if there is no direct threat to its citizens.
Drakos and Müller investigate the correla-
tion between technical security in the case 
of terrorism (measured by the average prob-
ability of a citizen to be subject to a terrorist 
attack) and perceived security (identifying 
terrorism as a major threat to the country). 
They conclude that technical security has 
a significant impact on perceived security. 
However, the R2 of their models, even when 
including time and country fixed effects and 
controlling for individual characteristics, is 
roughly around 0.2. Intuitively, this would 
indicate that technical security explains only 
a fifth of the variation in perceived security 
(Drakos and Mueller 2014).
As in the case of technical safety and per-
ceived safety, technical security and perceived 
security may not be strongly (Spearman rank) 
correlated if applying ηj to the former to 
arrive at the latter changes the ordering of 
groups. The relationship between perceived 
security and technical safety is mediated by 
both the aggregation effect and ηj leaving 
open the possibility that the two are not 
strongly correlated. The relationship between 
perceived safety and perceived security is 
mediated by additional factor δj, so these two 
concepts are possibly furthest removed from 
each other. However, we might imagine that 
their respective ‘fear factors,’ ηj and δj, may 
be related if similar processes widening the 
gap between perception and technical assess-
ment are at work at the individual and aggre-
gate level. One should note however, that this 
does not guarantee that perceived security 
and perceived safety will be correlated.
So far, we have seen that the term security 
covers a number of concepts that may not be 
(strongly) correlated. But before investigat-
ing this correlation empirically, it is impor-
tant to ask why it is important whether these 
concepts do or do not correlate. To see this, 
we turn to security interventions.
Which of the aspects of security 
to target? Rationales for security 
interventions
Above, I have defined a security intervention 
as a measure taken to improve one or more 
of the four concepts making up security in 
Rigterink: Does Security Imply Safety? On The (Lack of) 
Correlation Between Different Aspects of Security
Art. 39, page 6 of 21
Table 1. I will argue that different ration-
ales for undertaking a security intervention 
imply targeting different aspects of security 
and that security interventions targeting one 
aspect, even when doing so successfully, may 
adversely affect one or more other aspects of 
security. 
Note that the definition of security inter-
ventions implies, at least to a certain extent, 
benign intentions on the part of the inter-
vener. We may imagine interventions under-
taken in the name of ‘security’ that in reality 
do not aim to improve any aspect of security 
outlined in Table 1. For example: a military 
intervention for geo-political reasons, creat-
ing a large security apparatus to satisfy a mili-
tary industry lobby or to protect a dictator, or 
an intervention emphasizing a non-existent 
threat to create a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect. 
For the purpose of this paper, I will by defi-
nition exclude these actions from security 
interventions. Part of the argument put for-
ward in this paper is that security interven-
tions may in certain circumstances adversely 
affect some aspect of security. This would be 
an unremarkable conclusion indeed if the 
definition of security interventions included 
actions never aimed at improving any of 
these aspects in the first place.
Turning to possible rationales for under-
taking a security intervention, one such 
rationale may be humanitarian, a concern 
for those individuals in immediate danger 
of harm (Barnett 2005). This implies a secu-
rity intervention aimed at freeing individu-
als from these threats: providing technical 
safety. 
Alternatively we may see security as a pre-
condition for economic development and 
employ an economic rationale for a security 
intervention. Theory and empirical research 
suggests that production, and thus eco-
nomic development is related to a number 
of aspects of security. First, it is straightfor-
ward to see that production is related to 
technical safety: if individuals are harmed 
and property destroyed, this affects labour 
and capital that form the main ingredients 
in a production function. Second, perceived 
safety may affect investment decisions. If an 
individual perceives their future to be unsafe, 
this diminishes the incentive for investment. 
The impact of perceived safety on economic 
development may be as large as the impact 
of physical safety. In a study of the impact of 
insecurity on household welfare in Uganda 
for example, Rockmore (2011) concludes 
that roughly half the conflict-related losses 
were due to perceptions of risk, as opposed 
to physical violence. Third, economic devel-
opment may be related to technical security, 
if the individuals making up the aggregate 
entity form a market for the goods produced, 
or if there are spill-overs between productive 
activities of members of the group (such as 
increasing returns to scale or innovation). 
Finally, economic development may be 
related to perceived security, if we consider 
the perceived security of the aggregate entity 
and the institutions that could come with it 
as an asset that can attract investment. For 
instance, just like countries may be perceived 
internationally as ‘low corruption,’ to be per-
ceived internationally as ‘high security’ may 
be beneficial to economic development. In 
the case of corruption, it has been suggested 
that perceived corruption may be more 
strongly related to economic growth than 
the number of instances of corruption expe-
rienced (Toke 2009). Although perceived 
security may not trump technical security 
in its impact on economic development, it is 
clear that perceptions can play an important 
role. In sum, a security intervention with an 
economic rationale may target any or all four 
aspects making up security.
There may also be political rationales for 
security interventions: those with political 
power who are perceived to be providing 
safety and security may be regarded as more 
legitimate and may be more likely to hold 
on to power. Brück et al. (2014) for instance, 
model an incumbent government and oppo-
sition who promise and provide perceived 
protection from threats to increase their 
probability of (re-)election. In this model, only 
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the perception of being free from threats (as 
opposed to being technically free from them) 
is related to political popularity. Although 
this is, by necessity, a simplified view of real-
ity, it is not difficult to imagine that an inter-
vention which increases perceived (but not 
technical) safety or security benefits political 
popularity, whilst an intervention increas-
ing technical (but not perceived) safety or 
security may not be attractive to a politician 
motivated by re-election. Hence, a security 
intervention with a political rational may 
target perceived safety or perceived security.
The security gap: when a security 
intervention targeting one aspect of 
security adversely affects another
Using the arguments made so far, it is now 
possible to arrive at a characterization of the 
security gap. The security gap emerges when 
a security intervention, targeting a particular 
aspect of security, does not affect or adversely 
affects one or more of its other aspects. This 
is possible because different rationales for 
security interventions suggest targeting dif-
ferent aspects of security and because the 
four aspects of security do not necessarily 
correlate with each other. In fact, the weaker 
the correlation between the four concepts 
making up security presented in Table 1, 
the greater the scope for a security gap. This 
is why it is interesting to investigate empiri-
cally the extent to which different aspects of 
security correlate, which will be the subject 
of the next section. 
Before doing this however, I present three 
illustrations of the security gap: one stem-
ming from the theoretical model presented 
in Brück et al. (2014) which illustrates how 
security interventions with a political ration-
ale may decrease technical safety or security, 
one case study from South Sudan which 
illustrates how a security intervention with 
a humanitarian rationale decreased per-
ceived safety, and the case of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) which illustrates 
that security interventions can be redesigned 
based on a change in perceived security, 
whilst technical and perceived safety remain 
low. 
The theoretical model by Brück et al. 
(2014) features a government that faces 
a trade-off between spending on welfare 
and spending on protection against terror-
ist threats. Potential terrorists in turn face 
a trade-off between putting their labour 
towards terrorist activity or peaceful activity. 
Benefits to the latter increase with govern-
ment welfare spending and decrease when 
spending is diverted towards protection. 
The authors show that this model has two 
equilibria: one with high protection spend-
ing and high effort devoted to terrorism, one 
with low protection spending and low effort 
devoted to terrorism. To this model, they add 
a public, which can vote out the incumbent 
government, partially based on their per-
ception of terrorist threat. This incentivizes 
the incumbent to devote more resources to 
protection spending than it would if it only 
cared about threats realized, potentially 
diverting so many resources away from wel-
fare spending that returns to terrorist activ-
ity increase rather than decrease. This leads 
to the possibility that security interventions 
aiming to increase perceived safety lead to a 
higher number of threats realized, and thus a 
decrease in technical safety and security.
The second example is a case study exam-
ining the impact of a security intervention 
aiming to improve technical safety and secu-
rity from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
in South Sudan (Rigterink and Schomerus 
2015). The LRA is a rebel movement origi-
nally from Uganda, using abduction as a 
method of recruitment. A network of radio 
stations, with the support of various inter-
national organisations, broadcasts messages 
to LRA fighters encouraging them to defect 
(The Resolve 2013). This security interven-
tion is clearly aimed at decreasing the num-
ber of LRA fighters able to stage attacks and 
thereby at increasing technical security and 
safety. Some of its supporters claim that this 
security intervention has been successful on 
this front (Invisible Children 2013). However, 
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these broadcasts mean that inhabitants of 
the area these radio stations cover have to 
listen to messages about the LRA on a weekly 
basis. It is shown in Rigterink and Schomerus 
(2015) that inhabitants of areas in South 
Sudan with better reception of a participat-
ing radio station, express more fear of an LRA 
attack, controlling for indicators of technical 
security, than inhabitants of areas with poor 
radio reception. In this case, a security inter-
vention aimed at increasing technical safety 
and security has decreased perceived safety. 
Finally, the case of the DRC illustrates 
how decisions on security interventions can 
be taken on the basis of perceived security, 
whereas lack of technical and perceived 
safety persist. After the signing of a peace 
agreement in 2003, the Second Congo War 
officially ended, the DRC was no longer per-
ceived to be ‘in conflict.’ This gave the start-
ing sign for post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes, including such security inter-
ventions as disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration (DDR). However, a study by 
Dolan in 2010 reveals that at that point, in 
the perception of individuals ‘war is not yet 
over’ and warns that this implies that certain 
security interventions are not seen as appro-
priate (Dolan 2010). Furthermore, we shall 
see in a later section that according to some 
datasets, technical safety and technical secu-
rity was not necessarily lower during years 
when the perceived security situation was 
‘post-conflict’ compared to years ‘in conflict.’
Investigating the scope for the 
security gap empirically: the 
correlation between concepts 
making up security
Formulating indicators
So far, I have argued that the scope for a 
security gap depends on the extent to which 
the four aspects of security correlate and 
that conceptually, there are conditions under 
which this correlation will be weak. However, 
the extent to which the four concepts mak-
ing up security correlate in practice is a mat-
ter for empirical investigation. This will be 
the subject of the remainder of this paper. 
To enable a valid comparison, I will focus 
on one specific threat: being subjected to 
physical violence by a politically organised 
armed group, or political violence for short. 
Note that this includes violence by a state 
army. Furthermore, I will focus on one spe-
cific group of individuals: the state. The four 
concepts shown in Table 1 are redefined 
accordingly. Hence, from this point onward, 
technical safety is taken to mean the prob-
ability that an individual will be subjected 
to violence by a politically organised armed 
group, technical security is the average prob-
ability that the citizen of a state will be sub-
jected to violence by a politically organised 
armed group, etc. 
The choice for this particular threat and 
this particular group of individuals is partially 
motivated by availability of data. In addition, 
there has been a considerable amount of 
literature on the correlation between differ-
ent datasets of political violence (Eck 2012; 
Restrepo et al. 2006; Sambanis 2004). But in 
marked contrast to, for instance, the study of 
terrorism, there has been little attention to 
the role of perceptions and aggregation in 
explaining these differences. 
Empirically investigating the four aspects 
of security requires finding indicators for 
them. It is important to keep in mind that 
any indicator is by necessity an imperfect 
representation of the concept (Cartwright 
and Bradburn 2011). Thus, even if two con-
cepts correlate perfectly, indicators for these 
concepts might not. 
Definitions of each of the four aspects 
of security involve the word ‘probability.’ 
Probability is difficult to operationalize 
empirically as we can only observe past out-
comes, not current likelihood. Therefore, I 
am forced to approximate the latter using 
the former in the case of technical security 
and technical safety. Hence, technical safety 
is measured by whether an individual has 
been subjected to physical violence by a 
politically organised armed group over a 
particular period, and technical security is 
the number of citizens of a state who have 
been subjected to physical violence by a 
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politically armed group relative to the size 
of the state’s population. This is not with-
out controversy. Brück (2013) for instance 
argues that tracking instances of violence 
by politically organised armed groups can-
not help to measure security. Security should 
be measured, he argues, by threats realised 
relative to the inherent level of threat and 
the degree of protection (Brück 2013; Brück 
et al. 2014). It is clear that the measure I pro-
pose only reflects threats realized. However, 
since it is unlikely that we will ever be able to 
measure inherent threat, I argue that threats 
realised is the best available proxy for this 
aspect of security.
Individual perceptions of probability 
on the other hand, can be observed in the 
sense that it is possible to ask individuals 
to state their perceptions. In this paper, I 
will mostly focus on the degree of fear or 
concern expressed about physical violence 
by politically organised armed groups, as 
a measure of perceived safety and secu-
rity. There is ample precedence for taking 
this as an indicator of perceptions (Drakos 
and Mueller 2014; Rockmore 2011; Slovic 
et al. 1985). In addition, certain terms may 
express a high or low degree of concern 
about political violence, such as ‘at war’ or 
‘at peace.’
A brief history of data on political 
violence and description data used
A brief look at the history of data on politi-
cal violence illustrates how, in this context, 
interest has shifted over time toward measur-
ing different aspects of security. In addition, 
it describes the data used in the subsequent 
analysis. 
Two of the earliest datasets on violence 
by politically organised groups are the 
Correlates of War dataset (COW – first ver-
sion 1972) and the Armed Conflict Dataset 
by the Uppsala Conflict Data programme 
(UCDP – first version 2002). Both focus on 
aggregate aspects of security: the unit of 
analysis of both datasets is the state. Neither 
dataset explicitly aims to provide an indica-
tor for security as such: COW aims to capture 
war, and the dataset by UCDP aims to cap-
ture armed conflict. War and armed conflict 
are conceptualized as a condition that a state 
is either in or not in a given time period. 
Measuring the extent to which individuals 
are subject to political violence is a by-prod-
uct of the definition of this state-level condi-
tion. Amongst other criteria, both datasets 
require political violence to cause a certain 
number of casualties before it is classified 
as a war or an armed conflict respectively. 
Hence, COW includes the number of com-
batant fatalities from battle. In a separate 
dataset, UCDP records battle-related deaths, 
including civilian casualties from battle, for 
all armed conflicts it identifies from the year 
1989 onwards. Especially the last indicator, 
measuring the total number of citizens in 
a state subject to a particular threat, can be 
considered an indicator of technical secu-
rity. COW requires political violence to cause 
more than one thousand battle-related com-
batant fatalities for it to be classified as ‘war,’ 
the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset requires 
one thousand battle-related fatalities for a 
major, and 25 for a minor armed conflict. 
The number of battle-related (combatant) 
fatalities is not included in either dataset for 
instances when political violence does not 
reach this threshold. To classify as ‘battle,’ 
one of the parties to an instance of violence 
should be a state army. 
One interpretation of the COW and the 
UCDP Armed Conflict datasets is that they 
provide a measure of perceived security from 
political violence, based on technical secu-
rity. In this case, perceived security is the per-
ceived degree to which a state is subjected to 
political violence and there are only two such 
degrees: a condition of war (armed conflict) 
or the absence of this condition. In terms 
of the empirical representations presented 
in Table 1, 1
N
i it=å  is the total number 
of battle-related (combatant) fatalities in a 
country and perceived security is
1
1
*
N
i ji
t
N
h
=å
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where ηj = 0 if 1
N
i it=å  is smaller than one 
thousand (smaller than 25 for minor armed 
conflict) and 1  / ( )
N
j i in N t== å  otherwise. 
Abstracting away from the division by N, this 
measure of perceived security and the meas-
ure of technical security 1
N
i it=å  can be 
perfectly (Spearman rank) correlated, as the 
specified transformation need not affect the 
ranking of observations. 
Despite this, there is a possibility that per-
ceived and technical security correlate less 
than perfectly in this case. This depends on 
whether other perceptions of the security of 
a country play a role in the process through 
which the database is constructed. The pro-
cess of constructing such a database might 
be to continuously monitor battle-related 
(combatant) deaths in all the world’s coun-
tries and flag instances where this rises over 
the specified threshold. In the case of COW 
however, this appears to not have been the 
case. Documentation for this project states 
that the first step towards constructing this 
dataset was to ‘compile a list of all wars that 
could possibly be considered as [such]’ and a 
later step was to eliminate those with fewer 
than one thousand battle related combatant 
fatalities (Singer 1972). It is unclear whether 
UCDP employs a similar process, but it does 
not publish battle-related death numbers 
for country-years not identified as in armed 
conflict. This leaves open the possibility that 
countries exist that experienced political 
violence causing more than one thousand 
battle-related deaths that never made it to 
the initial list of potential wars, because of 
some perception that these countries were 
not at war. Furthermore, if such a perception 
exists for a particular country, it is possible 
that this influences how a particular instance 
of violence is classified. Instances of violence 
in a country that is not perceived to be at war 
may be less likely to be classified as battle 
compared to similar instances in a country 
perceived to be at war. The extent to which 
this happens in reality is again a matter for 
empirical investigation.
One point of critique on the above data-
sets is that armed conflict consists of more 
than battle involving a state army, perhaps 
even increasingly so (Kaldor 2006). Possibly 
in response to this, UCDP has published 
two new datasets, constructed analogously 
to the Armed Conflict Dataset above. In 
2007, a dataset on one-sided violence was 
introduced: amongst other criteria, a coun-
try is considered as experiencing one-sided 
violence if any armed actor perpetrates vio-
lence against civilians leading to more than 
25 deaths (Eck and Hultman 2007). In 2012, 
a dataset on non-state conflict followed: 
amongst other criteria, a country is consid-
ered to be in non-state conflict if there are 
more than 25 deaths from battle between two 
or more non-state armed actors (Sundberg 
et al. 2012). Both datasets thus include an indi-
cator for technical security, as a step towards 
creating an indicator measuring whether the 
state as a whole is in non-state conflict or in 
a situation of one-sided violence. It becomes 
increasingly doubtful whether it is useful to 
conceptualize non-state conflict or one-sided 
violence as a state-wide condition however, 
especially in the latter case. Whereas we may 
have a clear perception of what it means for 
a state to be ‘in armed conflict,’ this image is 
less strong for a state ‘in one-sided violence.’
Some more recent datasets abandon the 
state as a unit of analysis, using instead the 
individual instance of violence by a politi-
cally organized armed group or the event. The 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset 
(ACLED) is one of the first event based data-
sets, introduced in 2005 (Raleigh and Hegre 
2005). It categorizes its events as battle (a vio-
lent interaction between two or more organ-
ized armed groups), violence against civilians 
and riots/protests, among other smaller cat-
egories. UCDP followed in 2011 with its own 
event-based dataset, including events in each 
of its three categories of violence: armed con-
flict, non-state violence and one-sided violence 
(see Sundberg and Melander 2013). It should 
be noted that Africa is the only continent com-
prehensively covered by both datasets. 
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Both datasets provide indicators of techni-
cal security: the total number of instances 
of political violence, or the total number of 
casualties from instances of political violence 
in a state. Although they do not provide data 
at the individual level, and hence do not pro-
vide an indicator of technical safety as such, 
event databases do herald a shift in interest 
towards a level of aggregation lower than 
the state. Event databases are constructed 
through a systematic count of all instances of 
political violence reported by certain sources 
and do not aim to translate this to a state-wide 
condition. As such, they may be less subject 
the problem described earlier, where a coun-
try’s perceived degree of security influences 
the measurement of its technical security. 
However, it is still possible that the sources 
from which event databases draw their data, 
usually media sources or expert reports, are 
similarly biased in their reporting. This would 
likely cause a discrepancy between technical 
safety and measured technical security.
In addition to the increasing number of 
event-based datasets, there has been a call 
to collect more data on political violence at 
the individual or household level. Brück et al. 
(2010) argue for the inclusion of a standard-
ized module in existing household surveys 
containing questions that would provide 
indicators of technical safety, perceived secu-
rity and perceived safety. These include ques-
tions on whether a member if the household 
has been subjected to different types of 
violence, and on the respondent’s percep-
tion of the safety and security (e.g. how safe 
they feel their neighbourhood is, how often 
they fear that they or their family might be 
subject to particular forms of political vio-
lence). Although this module is not currently 
included as standard in a multi-country sur-
vey programme, it is clear that numerous 
individual surveys already include conflict-
related questions (Brück et al. 2010). 
This history of data collection on violence 
by politically organised armed groups illus-
trates how the focus of data collection efforts 
has shifted from providing a formalization 
of perceived security, to technical security, 
to technical and perceived safety. It should 
be noted that these new fields of inter-
est emerge in addition to ongoing work to 
update existing datasets. Hence, for some 
countries we now have indicators for each of 
the four aspects of security identified.
Results: technical security and 
perceived security in African 
countries
This section empirically investigates the 
correlation between casualties from vari-
ous forms of political violence according 
to ACLED and UCDP, and the correlation 
between ACLED casualties and the vari-
ous UCDP conflict indicators. As explained 
before, this explores the correlation between 
two indicators of technical security – one 
gathered with the aim of formalizing a per-
ception of security – and the correlation 
between an indicator of technical security 
and an indicator of perceived security.
The ACLED data is transformed so that it 
corresponds as close as possible to the UCDP 
categories. ACLED events classified as ‘battle’ 
and involving the ‘Armed forces of [state]’ are 
considered armed conflict events, events clas-
sified as ‘battle’ not involving armed forces 
of a state are considered non-state violence 
events, and events classified as ‘violence 
against civilians’ are classified as one-sided 
violence events. Riots and protests and a 
number of other minor categories of ACLED 
events are disregarded. Furthermore, Eck 
(2010) notes that UCDP requires the armed 
actors participating in ‘battle’ to be known, 
whereas ACLED also includes events in which 
the identity of participating actors is unknown 
(Eck 2012). Therefore, I exclude ACLED events 
for which a participating actor is coded as 
unidentified or is missing. The total number 
of casualties per year per country from each 
category of events is the variable used. Data 
covers African countries for the period 1989–
2011 (UCDP) and 1997–2011 (ACLED). 
Figure 1 displays this data for armed con-
flict in the DRC. The UCDP indicator takes 
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a value of one thousand for major armed 
conflict and of 250 for minor armed conflict 
for ease of visibility. According to this indica-
tor, the DRC is in major armed conflict from 
1996 to 2000, which decreases to a minor 
armed conflict in 2001, after which the DRC 
is armed conflict free. Minor armed con-
flict renews in 2006 to 2008. In years when 
UCDP Armed Conflict indicates that the DRC 
is in major conflict, the UCDP battle-related 
deaths indicator and ACLED’s number of 
deaths from battles including a state army 
follow reasonably similar trajectories. Once 
UCDP records that major armed conflict is 
over, they do not. The number of deaths in 
ACLED displays two sharp peaks – with casu-
alty numbers exceeding one thousand – that 
UCDP does not record. In this case, perceived 
security (the conflict indicator by UCDP) and 
technical security as measured by ACLED, do 
not appear to correlate strongly.
One possible explanation is that 2001 
marks the years in which Rwanda, Uganda 
and various non-stated armed parties agreed 
to withdraw forces from the DRC, under 
auspices of the UN, which had sent a peace 
mission to the DRC the year before. It is pos-
sible that this changed perceptions of secu-
rity in the DRC and that these perceptions in 
turn influenced the measurement of battle-
related deaths by UCDP to a greater degree 
than ACLED’s measurement.
Table 2 depicts the results of a more sys-
tematic comparison between UCDP and 
ACLED data. It shows the correlation coef-
ficients between the UCDP indicators of 
armed conflict, non-state conflict and one-
sided violence and UCDP-recorded casualty 
numbers for each of these types of political 
violence on the one hand, and casualties 
from corresponding conflict events in ACLED 
on the other. It presents Spearman correla-
tion coefficients for all pairs, point-biserial 
correlation coefficients when a dummy indi-
cator is correlated to a continuous variable 
and Pearson correlation coefficients for two 
Figure 1: Perceived security and technical security in the DRC.
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continuous variables. Correlations between 
the UCDP conflict indicator and UCDP casu-
alty estimates cannot be presented, as UCDP 
only provides casualty estimates for those 
country-years when the indicator equals one. 
We can see that the correlation between 
ACLED and UCDP data is generally fairly low. 
To provide a reference point, Sambanis (2004) 
investigates the correlation between several 
country level datasets on the prevalence of 
conflict. He finds (Pearson) correlation coeffi-
cients between 0.59 and 0.94, and concludes 
that the differences between various data-
sets are large enough to substantively impact 
analyses of conflict (Sambanis 2004). All but 
one of the correlation coefficients in Table 2 
are lower than the lowest correlation found 
by Sambanis. However, all correlation coef-
ficients but one are statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent level. Spearman correlation 
coefficients are generally higher than the 
other types of coefficients presented. It is 
known that the Spearman correlation coef-
ficient can be substantially higher and may 
overstate the extent to which a correlation is 
significant compared to the Pearson correla-
tion coefficient, when the data contains out-
liers and when the relationship is non-linear 
(Hauke and Kossowski 2001). 
In sum, if we view the various UCDP con-
flict indicators as formalization of a percep-
tion of security, this section shows that the 
correlation between perceived security and 
one indicator of technical security is fairly 
UCDP data ACLED data
Casualties from 
armed conflict 
events 
Casualties from 
non-state conflict 
events
Casualties from  
one-sided violence 
events
Armed conflict indicator
Spearman correlation 0.5151***
Point bi-serial correlation 0.1215**
Battle-related deaths
Spearman correlation 0.5639***
Pearson correlation 0.1757***
Non-state conflict indicator
Spearman correlation 0.5195***
Point bi-serial correlation 0.2311***
Battle-related deaths  
from non-state conflict
Spearman correlation 0.5492***
Pearson correlation 0.4764***
One-sided violence indicator
Spearman correlation 0.4501***
Point bi-serial correlation 0.1923***
Deaths from one-sided violence
Spearman correlation 0.5292***
Pearson correlation 0.7469***
Table 2: Correlations between UCDP and ACLED conflict data. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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weak. In addition, the correlation between 
the UCDP and ACLED indicators of technical 
security is fairly weak. 
Results: correlation between the 
four aspects of security in South 
Sudan
This section continues to empirically com-
pare indicators of the four aspects, now for 
the case of South Sudan. First, consider the 
correlation between perceived security and 
perceived safety. 
A very brief history of perceived secu-
rity in South Sudan could be the follow-
ing. Sudan experienced a violent conflict 
from 1983–2005, between the central 
government of Sudan and the SPLA/M, 
over independence of South Sudan. This 
conflict was ended by a Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) between both par-
ties in 2005. This agreement was in force 
during an interim period, in which a refer-
endum on independence of South Sudan 
was held, until the independence of South 
Sudan in 2011. Then, South Sudan enjoyed 
a period of peace, until violence renewed in 
December 2013. 
Now consider an indicator of perceived 
safety, derived from a survey of individuals 
executed in spring 2013 (before the renewed 
outbreak of violence). This covered 433 
randomly selected respondents the South-
Sudanese county of Ezo and part of Tambura 
County. These counties are located in the 
south-west of South Sudan, and border the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to 
the south, and the Central African Republic 
(CAR) to the east. Respondents to the survey 
were asked how often they feared for their 
safety, or that of their family, during three 
periods: during the war, during the CPA and 
in the last 12 months. For more details of this 
survey, see Rigterink et al. (2014).
Judging by perceived security, we may 
expect people living in South Sudan to feel 
particularly unsafe during the civil war. We 
may furthermore expect perceived safety 
to increase during the CPA, and increase 
further after independence. The indicator 
of perceived safety however, does not con-
form to this expectation, as is clear from 
Figure 2. Perceived safety appears no less 
prevalent in the 12 months preceding April 
2013, compared to during ‘the war.’ A total 
of 376 respondents (79.3 per cent1) say 
that they have feared for their safety ‘often’ 
during the war, compared to 388 (85.9 per 
cent) in the last 12 months. Fear for safety 
appears to have been lowest during the CPA 
(248 respondents – 42.6 per cent – feared for 
their safety often).
These answers are subject to recall bias: it 
is possible that more recent threats to the 
respondents’ safety are still clearly on their 
minds, whilst threats further in the past are 
increasingly forgotten. This could explain 
the lack of perceived safety since the war, but 
not the increase in perceived safety during 
the CPA. In this case, perceived security and 
perceived safety do not seem to be strongly 
related. 
A threat specific to this region of South 
Sudan is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
Originally from Uganda, the LRA has drawn 
international attention partly through their 
method of recruiting new fighters through 
abduction. For this specific threat, indicators 
of technical security, technical safety and 
perceived safety are available. 
Invisible Children and Resolve have con-
structed an event-based dataset on LRA activ-
ity. ‘Events’ recorded in this dataset include 
abductions, sightings of the LRA, clashes 
between the LRA and other armed groups, 
civilian deaths and injuries, displacement 
related to the LRA, and ‘returnees’ – fight-
ers defecting from the LRA. For the purpose 
of this paper, I exclude ‘returnees,’ as these 
events do not clearly constitute a threat. The 
total number of remaining events can be 
considered an indicator of technical security: 
the total number of threats in an area. From 
the JSRP survey, I take the answers to the 
question ‘in the past 12 months, how often 
have you feared that the LRA would come 
and attack your village?’ as an indicator of 
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perceived safety. Furthermore, respondents 
reported whether they, or a member of their 
close family experienced various types of vio-
lence by the LRA (a family member killed or 
abducted, being wounded, abducted or hav-
ing one’s house burned down or destroyed). 
This can be considered an indicator of tech-
nical safety. 
Figure 3 maps technical security, LRA 
‘events’ in the 12 months preceding the JSRP 
survey, according to the LRA crisis tracker. It 
also shows the indicator of perceived safety, 
fear of the LRA, in the 10 villages covered by 
the JSRP survey. 
Figure 3 shows that, according to the 
event-based data, there have been no LRA 
related incidents in South Sudan in the 12 
months preceding the JSRP survey in 2013. 
In addition (not shown), the LRA crisis 
tracker records no incidents involving the 
LRA in the calendar year 2012. However, this 
level of technical security does not translate 
in individual perceptions of safety according 
to the survey data. On average across villages, 
75 per cent of respondents indicate that they 
have feared often that the LRA would come 
and attack their village in the past year. An 
additional 19.5 per cent has feared for this 
to occur sometimes. Respondents Ezo and 
Tambura perceive themselves to have been 
profoundly unsafe in the preceding year, 
despite technical security in the sense of the 
absence of a single LRA event in South Sudan 
according to the event-based data. 
Because there are no LRA events in South 
Sudan at all, it is impossible to calculate the 
correlation between this indicator of techni-
cal security and other indicators. Therefore, 
I construct an alternative measure: distance 
to the nearest LRA event. I experiment 
with different ways to calculate distance to 
the nearest LRA events: the distance to the 
Figure 2: Perceived safety in South Sudan in May 2013.
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Figure 3: Technical security and perceived safety from the LRA in South Sudan.
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single closest events in the last one, two 
and five years and the average distance to 
the ten closest LRA events in the same time 
periods. Furthermore, I distinguish between 
event types involve direct violence against 
civilians (abduction and violence against 
civilians) and those that do not (sightings, 
looting, displacement and clashes). For the 
indicator of technical safety, I also distin-
guish between being directly subjected to 
LRA violence (being wounded, abducted, 
having one’s house burned down) and being 
indirectly subjected to LRA violence (having 
a family member killed or abducted). Only 
a small number of respondents have been 
directly (6) or indirectly (27) subjected to 
LRA violence. 
Table 3 displays the correlation between 
these indicators of technical security, techni-
cal safety and perceived security. First look 
at the correlation between fear of the LRA 
among respondents, and the straight-line 
distance from their village of residence to 
the nearest LRA event(s).2 The correlation 
coefficients all have the expected sign: the 
further away the nearest LRA related inci-
dent, the lower the level of fear among the 
respondents. A substantial number of them 
are statistically significant. However, most 
correlation coefficients are small in size; in 
only a handful of cases does the coefficient 
exceed 0.2. 
The correlation between distance to the 
nearest LRA event(s) and the indicators of 
Fear of LRA Indicator directly 
subjected to LRA
Indicator indirectly 
subjected to LRA
Spearman Pearson Spearman Point bi-serial Spearman Point-biserial
Distance to closest LRA event:
In the last year −0.0072 −0.0380 −0.0214 0.0070 −0.0469 −0.0534
In the last year, 
involving civilians
−0.1351*** −0.1873*** −0.0100 −0.0193 0.0675 0.0662
In the last 2 years −0.0892* −0.1141** −0.0212 −0.0363 −0.0432 −0.0378
In the last 2 years 
involving civilians
−0.0937* −0.1096** −0.0230 −0.0341 −0.0023 −0.0159
In the last 5 years 0.0478 −0.0203 0.0217 0.0235 −0.0330 −0.0227
In the last 5 years 
involving civilians
0.0128 −0.0414 0.0639 0.0400 −0.0126 −0.0140
Average distance to 10 closest LRA events:
In the last year −0.1560*** −0.1886*** 0.0266 −0.0060 0.0559 0.0356
In the last year, 
involving civilians
−0.1691*** −0.2048*** 0.0227 −0.0165 0.0597 0.0667
In the last 2 years −0.1761*** −0.2160*** −0.0083 −0.0083 0.0840* 0.0692
In the last 2 years 
involving civilians
−0.2001*** −0.2228*** 0.0044 0.0051 0.1092** 0.0986*
In the last 5 years −0.0251 −0.0815* 0.0498 0.0222 −0.0251 −0.0001
In the last 5 years 
involving civilians
−0.0487 −0.0923* 0.0498 0.0206 0.0140 0.0043
Fear LRA 0.0539 0.0487 0.0087 −0.0267
Table 3: Correlation distance to LRA-related events, fear and experience of LRA. ***p < 0.01, 
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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being subjected to the LRA is even weaker: 
only in one case does the correlation coeffi-
cient exceed 0.1. Furthermore, the coefficients 
are seldom statistically significant and do not 
always carry the expected (negative) sign. The 
correlation between perceived safety (fear of 
the LRA) and technical safety (being subjected 
to LRA violence) is similarly weak: none of the 
correlation coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant and they are small in size. 
In this case, technical security and tech-
nical safety appear to correlate relatively 
weakly, whilst a correlation between techni-
cal security and perceived safety, or between 
technical safety and perceived safety, appears 
to be completely absent. 
Conclusion and implications for 
research and policy
This paper has distinguished four distinct 
concepts, all covered by the term ‘security’: 
technical safety, perceived safety, technical 
security and perceived security. It has shown 
that these four aspects of security conceptu-
ally need not correlate, and that in two cases, 
they indeed correlate weakly in practice. This 
is relevant because the weaker the relation-
ship between the four concepts of security is, 
the larger the scope for a security gap. It is 
not obvious which sole aspect of security a 
security intervention should target; different 
rationales for interventions suggest targeting 
different aspects. When aspects of security do 
not correlate, this leaves open the possibility 
that a security intervention, while targeting 
one of the aspects of security successfully, 
does not affect or adversely affects another. 
This is one expression of a security gap.
Although this paper fails to find a strong 
correlation between various indicators of 
‘security,’ this should not be construed as 
a critique on the quality of the data used. 
Assessing the data quality would require 
insight into the data gathering and quality 
control procedures that this paper lacks. As 
has been highlighted, indicators of ‘security’ 
may correlate weakly because they measure 
different concepts covered by the term. 
The conclusions presented do have impli-
cations for research on ‘security’ using quan-
titative data. They imply that conclusions of 
research done on one concept making up 
security cannot necessarily be generalized 
to others. For example, if research concludes 
that absence of natural resources, high levels 
of GDP or ‘peace-building’ interventions are 
related to decreased armed conflict, possibly 
an indicator of perceived security, this does 
not necessarily imply that the same factors 
are systematically related to improved (per-
ceptions of) safety at the individual level. 
This is relevant because research on ‘secu-
rity’ is often motivated at the individual level. 
A common motivation behind this research 
is that insecurity, conflict or violence are a 
human tragedy, making research on it intrin-
sically important. It is not uncommon for 
example, for the introduction to an article 
containing research on armed conflict, to 
start with a tally of the human costs that 
conflict has inflicted since the Second World 
War (see for example Brückner and Ciccone, 
2010). This paper suggests that even if this 
research contributes to better knowledge on 
how to prevent or end armed conflict this 
may not translate one-on-one into improve-
ments in technical security or individual 
(perceptions of) safety. 
Alternatively, ‘security’ may be a subject 
meriting study because of its economic 
costs. It is widely accepted that perceptions 
of safety and security influence the value of 
the future relative to the past (intuitively, 
people become less forward-looking), which 
decreases investment and thereby income 
(see for example Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004; 
Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Rockmore, 
2011). This paper has shown that individu-
als’ perception of their own safety on the 
one hand, and their technical safety or aggre-
gate aspects of security may only be loosely 
related. For example, if country-level or event 
data suggest the absence of violent conflict, 
it is not impossible that the economic costs 
of the lack of individual perception of safety 
are still severe. 
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Similar caveats apply to policy interven-
tions aiming to achieve ‘security’: policies 
that ‘work’ on one aspect of security cannot 
be directly translated to another. In fact, 
possible adverse effects on other aspects of 
security probably merit some investigation. 
For example, international mediation dur-
ing peace talks may create perceived secu-
rity. But this does not necessarily translate 
directly into technical security or safety, and 
as such may not be a big first step towards 
economic development. Some policy docu-
ments do appear to make such direct con-
nections. UN documentation containing 
guidance for mediators on conflict-related 
sexual violence in ceasefires and peace agree-
ments states for example: ‘[Conflict-related 
sexual violence] instils fear, breaks identity 
and creates enduring ethnic, family and 
community divides. Yet, to date, [ . . . ] only 
three ceasefire agreements [ . . . ] specifically 
include sexual violence’ (United Nations 
2012). Although this is an example of an 
attempt to broaden the definition of ‘secu-
rity’ to include previously ignored forms of 
violence, this particular formulation seems 
to suggest that when included in a peace 
agreement, fear of sexual violence and the 
resulting tensions will diminish. This paper 
suggests that one cannot uncritically make 
any such direct connection between security 
and safety. 
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Notes
 1 All percentages are weighted percentages.
 2 It should be noted that in calculating 
the Pearson correlation coefficient, I 
treat the variable representing fear of 
the LRA as continuous, whereas it is 
in fact ordinal. Although it has been 
shown that Pearson correlation is robust 
to similar violations of its assumptions 
(Norman 2010).
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